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I. The concept of tolerance is made central. in studying certain
behavioral models. A precise mathematical definition of tolerance
will be used in order to interpret psychological evidence in terms
of these models- The models will be phenomenological in nature and
are therefore of limited value in interpreting complex human behavior.
However, they exhibit certain interesting features worth study. The
following expose is not considered as the endpoint of our study but as
starting point in investigating similar models which may hopefully be-
come more and more adequate to describe human behavior.
II. Human behavior is complex largely because the human brain is
complex. Each of its 10 9 neurons forms on the average about a hundred
synaptic junctions by its talodendria and as many interconnections by
its dentrites. However, the human nervous system is not entirely pre-
wired, but is capable of growth and reorganization. Learning, for
example, imposes again and again additional organization on the higher
levels of the nervous system. It sums unlikely that the genes would
carry the information to specify each of the 10 11 interconnections of
brain cells. The brain grows and matures for many years. However,
when enough junctions in a circuit are established, many concepts of
systems theory, as e.g., the concept of feedback, become debatable.
One approach to the study of brain function involves the investigation
of relatively small and simple neuron networks and the search for
evidence in human behavior which may be the outcome of their activity.
Instabilities in neural circuits of the brain, for example, are related
by some investigators to various kinds of diLorders of thought. But
still we will not b- able to describe such activity adequately, e.g.,
in conventional systems theory alone. F-jr example, fundamental concepts
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of neural systems such as the facilitation and timing of their
growth, their plasticity,maturation and adaptability, fundamental
properties of the organizetion of brain matter, are outside its
scope. Such underlying brain properties may result in behavioral
eve.-its described --.n psychological terms and are far from being under-
stood. It is shown by psychological experiments [Asratian, 19651
that, e.g., functional plasticity of the human nervous system is
responsible for certain traits of personality. Memory may be re-
lated to neuron growth and strengthening of the synaptic junctions
and so on.
However, we may also pose the question in the reverse direc-
tion. That is, we may ask what implications for the functioning
of specific neural systems of the brain derive from observed patterns
of behavior such as the rise of a conflict, its repression, the
ego-id control or reality testing? The hope is to find by such an
approach features of brain matter unknown in conventional systems
theory but relevant to the maturation of human personality.
Nq
 example would De to proceed from the study of conflict
situations to their implications on control circuits of neurons, or
we may try to find implications for the reactivity and strength of
neuron interconnections derived from the observed inverse relation-
ship between the dimension of a personality called "strength of its
nervous system" and its reactivity. Another well-known example from
physiological psychology is the assumption of reinforcement processes
in certain brain parts which lead to pleasure seeking drives.
III. The complexity of human behavior forces us at once to
study a behavioral model which is simple enough to be manageable.
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Thus, we will make few specific assumptions rather than overload the
behavioral model with complexity. However, such a model should still
exhibit sufficiently complex features relevant for human behavior.
The model's behavior is supposed to consist entirely of adapta-
tion and defense acts. The "internal" behavior of the model is
schematized by states which are completely described by the model's
adaptabilities and reactivities with regard to external (physical or
mental) stimuli. That is, the internal states are described by the
model's ability to change its responses to enviroruiental stimuli.
These abilities have to be functions of time (t) if the model is able
to "mature". This explicit time dependence of states will be distinguish-
ed from the time dependence arising from the time dependence of the
external stimuli. In addition, the internal states are described by
the sensitivity of the model to changes in external stimuli; i.e., by
its reactivities. Such reactivities lead to defense acts of the model.
Thus, we have a set of states induced by external stimuli. They
are described by time dependent coordinates, the reactivities and
adaptabilities. We then have a map of the set of stimuli X into the
state space describing the internal reaction of the model to the en-
vironment and its changes, and a iaap of X into Y, the set of possible
responses of the model.
In order to illustrate this, let us give some examples.
If, quite generally, the operational definition of our models can
be given in terms of relations, S i , between a sequence of inputs
(xl........xn) and a sequence of outputs (Yl ...... y m) i.e., if
yi = Si (x1 (t; , ....xn (t) , t), i =
3
then reactivities, rij , and adaptabilities, air may be defined
according to G. Houghton [2,3] by the derivatives*
a
...x ,t) and a _ 8	 S (x ...x ,t), j=l...m.
rij - ax j S i ' x	 l	 n	 it 	 1	 n
The additional time parameter gives the explicit time dependence
of the model and a/atlex denotes the derivative with regard to
explicit time. For example, within limits the discharge frequency
w of a single nerve fits the logarithmic response law:
w (x,t) = S (x, t) = a[e-b ( t-t0) + C; log x/x0 + w0
 ,
W (x<x0 ,t) = w (x,t<t0) = O
where x is the stimulus amplitude at time to , and x0 is the minimum
amount of stimulus which triggers the fiber to fire with frequency
w0 . The time dependence in e-b(t--to) describes the adaptation of
the nerve fiber (a,b,C, are constants of dimension [1/t]).
Then the internal states of the nerve fiber are described by
the adaptability
w {x, t) - w0
lal - b C exg b t-t0 +1
and the reactivity in regard to changes of x
r = ax -1 [e -b ( t-t0) + C ] , (x?x0 , t>to)
The nerve fiber exhibits no adaptability for the minimum amount of
*Here Jai l should be called "adaptability" rather than ai.
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stimulus, Its adaptability increases if the stimulus amplitude in-
creases, but decreases with time; jal is proportional to the decay
constant b. The reactivity in regard to changes in x decreases with
time as well as with increasing stimulus amplitude.
The counterpart of this example in physiological psychology would
be a generalization of the Weber-Fechner law or Stevens law [Teitelbaum
19u71 and the corresponding adaptability anG reactivity.
IV. An invaluable characteristic of the brain is its invulnera-
bility. Malfunction in one of its (numerous) local working parts does
not shut down the entire system. Its basic elements function for many
years despite the fact that each day several thousand neurons die and
are never replaced. A superfluous number of functional units in the
brain provides a latent reserve so that they can take over functions
from other damaged units. This allows the brain to circumvent unreli-
ability arising from malfunction or death of single localized units.
Furthermore, such a safety factor may have the consequence that a
specific function of the brain is not inherent in any particular local
neuron system but is distributed over several brain parts. Indeed,
attempts to localize complex mental functions in specific parts of the
brain often fail [Luria, 1963].
In order to simulate such behavior we assume that each time the
model is exposed to external stimulus 1) the adaptabilities and re-
activities of functional units change and 2) in general more than one
'init responds. We introduce such a multiplexity so that the reliabil-
ity of the entire model can be greater than the reliability of its
components. This is characteristic of human behavior.
Now we will give a more specific structure to our model:
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Definition (i) u-cluster (denoted by C u ): set of functional units
(U CL 	 = 1,2....) whose internal states depend at most on the stimulus
variables on which the states of unit u depend. The responses of these
units (in a given state) -re identical and furthermore the intersection
of the set of their states, Wu , with the set of states of u is not
a
empty. We denote by WC	
u t'the set v C Wu a . F unit may belong to
U	 a	 u
several clusters, u e C u of course.
Let V be a subset of external stimuli (V C X).
Definition (ii) We call the set of states occupied by the clusters
which are sensitive to V the V-configuration of the model.
Assumptions: (a) The model consists of clusters as defined above.
The units of a cluster are indistinguishable insofar as a configura-
tion determines a behavioral act of the model, regardless which of
the units gives a certain response.
Furthermore we suppose that
(b) the interconnections between the elements of a cluster are such
that they can be represented by directed lines having the following
meaning:
Definition (iii) A directed line o -4- o ( j e I, I set of indices)
W wj
means: If at given time state w is occupied by a unit, u say, then
w  a WCu and w  is occupied too. (Occupied by a unit which of -,,urse
belongs to the u-cluster.)
If two units are in the same state we neglect the corresponding
line since they give the same response in any case.
(c) It is assumed that the set U = {wj I line w w  existslr is
finite for a finite set V and that the internal state w also belongs
to such a finite set.
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Then each cluster of functional units is represented for fixed
time t and given V,
19651. We denote t
set by Q (w) . R  (w)
paths with length <
a r.lassification of
isolates.
by a (not necessarily connected) digraph [Iiarary,
he reachable set of w by R(w) and its antecedent
denotes the set of states reachable from w by
p (p a natural number). In the usual way we have
states as receivers, transmitters,carriers or
Two examples given in appendix A may help to clarify the fore-
going. There we use the method described above to construct internal
states. In appendix B we give all possible structurally distinct di-
graphs if the number (n) of states is n = 2 or 3 for given V. This
shows that the number of possible models is considerably restricted
for finite state spaces. The appendix also shows that our assumptions
and definitions are consistent since they can be illustrated by ex-
amples.
V. A digraph reflects detailed internal structure of the models.
Yet we are mainl-, ,
 interested in correlations between general features
of digraphs and the way these models respond to external stimuli.
Given a certain mechanism for reaction to the environment there
is little remarkable about its activities. However, we may sometimes
wonder why in nature complex organisms do not react to certain stimuli.
What additional features enable such "action mechanisms" to restrain
from action? Actually there are many varieties of inaction in nature
such as death, rest, inhibi.:ion, or repression.
On the other hand the action of a realistic model should not ex-
hibit a one to one __elation between its internal "configurations" and
its responses. For example, two states of a brain which occur at
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different times and which are represented by the rea p*i •,lties and
adaptabil i.ties of its many functional units, composed of about 109
neurons, may be associated with the same thought even if the brain
lost a few thousand neurons by aging. A realistic model should be
able to mature this is why we have included explicit time. Further-
more,we do not exclude the possibility that the model may tend to
respond to a certain stimulus varLable in different ways - different
units of a cluster may be in different states giving opposed responses.
The model may then be in a "conflict situation".
Therefore, in order to provide precise definitions for such terms,
borrowed from psychology, and in order to be able to describe the a-
bove mentioned features of a realistic model to some extent, we will
make set WC
 into a "tolerance space". Behavioral acts of the model will
u
be determined by its internal configuration as well as by a tolerance
arising from the interconnections between the states of this configura-
tion as shown in the corresponding digraphs.
Assumption: (d) The set WCi s a tolerance space	 (T-space).
CU
"ater on we will give concrete realizations of tolerances onWC
u
First we give some basic definitions concerning tolerance spaces.
Tolerance spaces were first used by E.C. Zeeman to describe certain
features of visual perception and memory.
Definition (iv) A toleranceE on a set w is a subset of the cartesian
product WxW with the properties:
a) (w,w)E^	 for all w c W
b) i^ (wa	 ws )E^	 th-n (ws , wa)E E
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A tolt!rance space, (W, ^), is the set W together with a tolerance ^.
The points w  and w 6
 are said to be within tolerance, (wa - ws).
A tolerance like a basis of neighborhoods of a topological space
imprints a structure on the set W. Many biological examples of tolerance
spaces such as the visual field have been given by E.C. Zeaman.
Definition (v) The induced tolerance on the power set of W, Lw, is
defined as fellows:
Given A, A'C Lw ; A ^ A' (A and A' are in tolerance) iff A'C: E A
and A(7W , where ^A = {wlw eW , w a eA and (w 
cc 
w)eE} and similarly
for EA'.
Let f be a map between two sets X, Y and let (X, ^) be a tolerance
space. Then the induce-I tolerance, n _ E f, on Y is given by yl
f ( X 1 )	 y 2 = f ( x 2 ) i^f X1 - X2.
De=finition (vi) We call the set T^(wa ) = {wlw,wa e W and (w,wa)e^}
the tolerance base of w  (T-base of wa).
Thus, the behavioral model is realized 1) by the ^3lation struc-
tures: Mu = {WC ; ^ u , 1} where Cu is a giver. tolerance on Wnd
u	 Cu
1(w.w') the relation: "line w'w exists", and 2) by maps
gua : X i WCU
f : WC -" Y
u
performed by the `unctional units, ua a Cu , ael.*
VI. Let V and t be givan, where V is chosen such that the model
contains at least one functional unit, u say, whose states at time t
depend on V and not only on a subset of V. We will consider clusters
of such units and the associated digraphs.
u lables the units of the model.
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An intrinsic tolerance on iti, , having a plausible interpretation,
%U
is realized us follows:
7L (- WCu x W`
 w'th (w,w)E; u and (w^,wR)E^u ifr wa
u
and w are 3-joint by paths of len gth one in Du , where w „ ,w R EWC and
r	 *	 1
Du
 is the digraph describing Cu
 (for V at time t).
Obviously
,:
 is a symmetric and reflexive relation on W
	 InC 
u
general it is not transitive.
St-tes in tolerance are always occupied simultaneously. Elements
of Cu
 can (aid do) exchange their states before the model "notices”
any difference - that is, before it changes its responses - if these
states are within tolerance. (To verify this note that because of
assu*nDtion (a) the units generate the same sequence of responses before
and after the change). Therefore we can regard two states in toler-
ance as equivalent to some extent ever_ if they correspond to
different responses of the model. Vertices of complete symmetric
(as1:wmetric) digraphs are all within (outside) tolerance. The tol-
erance yu is tiire dependent and takes part in the maturation process.
We can generalize the tolerance given above including in 5
u
pairs of points w__ich are 3-joint by paths of length < Z where k is
a natural number. Models may be characterized by the strength of
their tolerance (L).
Tn what follows we consider a given tolerance 
`°u 
on WCu with
given strength x. and suppose that the model has developed a tolerance
(in a psychological sense) as a necessity for its reliability and its
stability
 in regard to certain environmental changes. That is, if
We choose this rather (unnecessarily) complicated description of
u
because it is generalizable.
10
F) = } f
 is the inducec _olerancc on the set of possible responses Y,
then responses as well as adaprabilit.ies and reactivities within
(mathematical) tolerance, ;^ and 
&u 
respectively, have no opposed
tendencies and lead to one well-defined reaction of t':e model.
The induced tolerance rj is not necessarily the maximum tolerance
on Y; instead r'; '_
 
n where n is the set of all pairs of responses mu-
tually compatible and leading to one well-defined reaction.
For example, the reacting of the model may not depend on (small)
quantitative differences in the responses of the units as long as
these responses are within tolerance.
On the other hand, given a tolerance on W, the set of environ-
mental stimulus variables is also a T-space according to the
following definition:
.0	 u	 u E u	 ux i xi and x i -x j (i#j)iff R 1 (wi)	 rwj} and R 1 (wj )	 iwi}
where
U
wk 
__ gu (xk)
This tolerance corresponds to a "just noticeable difference" In
physiological psychology [Zeemann, 1968] which is a symmetric, re-
flexive and nontransitive relation between stimuli. Two stimuli
must be out of this tolerance if the model is to distinguish between
them. Again this tolerance, i.e. the J.n.d., depends on the
"maturity" of the model.
G. Houghton [2] interpretes the units of his model and their
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functioning by Freudian concepts such as the id, ego, superego, their
conscious and unconscious parts. He simulates, for example, the eao
id control mechanism by a feedback circuit of linear units by which
he describes the ego and the id assuming that nonlinearities can be
neglected in a first approximation. Nonlinearities may arise from
interactions between the conscious and unconscious levels of activity
of the ego and id units. However, in our picture their states are
represented in first approx-oration by isolates in which case a toler-
ance is impossible. A tolerance of finite strength can only be
developed in the case of interactions of consciousness and unconsious-
ness.
We conclude this section with some examples from the behavioral
repertoire of our models.
Conflicting :action  tendencies can and do struggle against each
other within human beings. We expect that a theoretical formulation
of conflict. can help us to understand such behavior.
Consider the conflict behavior of the models as competition be-
tween incompatible response tendencies. The models may then exhibit
two different kinds of conflict behavior if R 1 (wu ) ,ZT ( wu ) . (For
u
example R,(wu) may contain receivers or transmitters.) An unconscious
conflict occurs if f maps R 1 (wu ) into T"I (yu ) (where f(wu ) = yu ); an
open conflict occurs if f(R1(wu)) ^ T 9 (yu ). In the first case the
responses have no opposite tendencies. However, the internal states,
occupied by cluster Cu , may have opposite reactivities or adaptabili-
ties in regard to changes of the environment. The formation of
conflict depends on the strength of the tolerance. In some cases a
conflict can be resolved by developing a stronger tolerance.
Similarly, the model exhibits different forms of inactivity. As
12
nmentioned, in any complete account of behavior we
explain the organism's inaction as well as its ac
are many varieties of inaction in nature. Let yo
response". If for some i, y i e T n (yo ),we say the
aroused rather then performed since they may lie
threshold. If
must be able to
tion - and there
represent "no
responses y i are
under the behavioral
R 1 !w u)	 T (wu)	 f ( wu )	 yo
u
and f -laps R^wu) into Tn (yo), we may have the following inaction.
Either T 7 (yo ) = fyo } (rest) or T n (yo )n {yo} 30 yo
 (inhibition), or we may
have the corresponding situation with underlying conflict if
R 1 (wu)	 TEu (wu) .
Recall that the model acquired several means of responding to
the same stimuli. Essentially this is possible because of the pool
of superfluous functional units which serve as latent reserve. This
pool confers great reliability on the model. We saw that this assump-
tion has important implications. W_­ might add, as an additional
example, that states which remain occupied for a period of time, even
by different units, may act as memory.
VII. As previously remarked we intended in this paper to operate
with a few specific assumptions so as to avoid overloading the models
with complexity. However, in order to study detailed behavior we
need to impose more empirical structure on the models. A possible
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further step would be to turn the digraphs into signed digraphs (or
nets) where the weights determine the internal dynamics of the models.
In any case the different elements of the behavioral repertoire of
these models provide foundation stones with which we can build more
sophisticated models.
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APPENDIX A: We use the method of page 4 to const •_urt internal states
(denoted by circles). The input - output relation of functional
units is given by y = u(x,z,t).
In both examples we choose three units with n = 9 for a certain
V. DC
 denotes the digraph associated with the u a-cluster, where
ua
first points of a line are internal states of ua.
Fig. 1
yI = uI (x,z) = jxz(sgn xz + 1)
yII = uII(x) = Zx(sgn x + 1)
yIII	 uIII(z) = lz(sgn z + 1)
V = {x = 0, t 1; z = 0, ± 1, xz > 01
DCuII 
and 
DCuIII 
are totally disconnected.
Fig. 2 (see next page)
y l = u l (x,t) = xt(sgn xt + 1)
Y2 = u 2 (x, t) = xt sgn xt
Y3 = u 3 (x,t) = -xt (sgn(-xt) + 1)
V = {xo , 0, -x0}
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APPENDIX B:
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Fig. 3: All structurally distinct digraphs for n=2 and 3.
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